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tacitly admitted that Section 634 does not protect against future prosecution.
Unless the statute can be so construed as to include this protection, it is possible
that Section 634 could be held unconstitutional on the ground that the immunity it affords is not as broad as that provided by the Constitution.
In view of the fundamental importance of the privilege against self-incrimination, the existing immunity statute should not be left to the uncertainties of
judicial construction. Legislation should be sponsored to clarify the scope of
Section 634 with respect to contempt and to provide an immunity as broad as
that in the Constitution.

FAILURE TO PLEAD FEDERAL COMPULSORY
COUNTERCLAIM AS BAR TO STATE SUIT,
The plaintiff administrator sued in a Massachusetts state court to recover
for the wrongful death of the decedent, killed when his auto collided with that
of the defendant. In a prior suit arising out of the same accident, a federal district court had awarded damages to the defendant (plaintiff there) against the
decedent's administrator. The defendant claimed that the district court judgment was res judicata and that the plaintiff's alleged cause of action should have
been pleaded in the prior suit in compliance with the compulsory counterclaim
provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Massachusetts trial
court entered judgment for the defendant notwithstanding a verdict for the
plaintiff. On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court this judgment was reversed.
Campbell v. Ashler.2

The court reasoned that the judgment of the federal district court was not
res judicata in the instant action because the administrator was acting in a
different capacity in the federal court and was therefore not the same party.
There the administrator represented the estate of the deceased for the "benefit
of creditors and distributees," while in the present case he represented the heirs
or next of kin pursuant to the Massachusetts wrongful death statute. 3 It is conceivable that two distinct causes of action exist,4 one a common law cause of
Rule i3(a), 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 723c. See note ii, infra.
Mass. 475, 70 N.E. 2d 302 (1946).
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3 McCarthy v. Wood Lumber Co., 219 Mass. 566, 107 N.E. 439 (x9r4); Beauvais v. Springfield Institution for Savings, 303 Mass. 136, 20 N.E. 2d 957 (1939); Eaton v. Walker, 244 Mass.
23, 138 N.E. 798 (1923). There is similar authority in other jurisdictions. May Coal Co. v.
Robinette, 120 Ohio St. iio, 165 N.E. 576 (1929); Spradlin v. Georgia R. & Electric Co., 139
Ga. 575, 77 S.E. 799 (i913). See Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Schendell, 270 U.S. 6ri (1926),
and Troxell v. Del. Lack. &West. R. Co., 227 U.S. 434 (1913). The leading Massachusetts de-

cision, the McCarthy case supra, may be distinguished from the instant case, however. There
the administrator had recovered in an action for personal injuries which had been commenced
by the deceased in her lifetime. That judgment was held not to bar a further recovery under the
wrongful death statute.
4 Secrest v. Pacific Electric R. Co., 6o Cal. App. 2d 746, 4 P. 2d 747 (1943); Farrington v.
Stoddard, 115 F. 2d 96 (C.C.A. Ist, 1940). 4 Rest., Torts § 925, comment i (i939) states,
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action for pain and suffering and personal injuries to the decedent, for the
benefit of the estate, and the other a statutory cause of action for death,
accruing to the benefit of the next of kin. Although the weight of authority is to
the contrary,S it might not be unreasonable to say that a judgment rendered
in favor of the administrator for the decedent's personal injuries should not
operate to bar further recovery under the wrongful death statute.6 When judgment has been rendered adverse to the administrator in an action for damages,
however, the adjudication should act as a bar to a further claim for wrongful
death.7 A judgment for damages rendered in favor of the defendant strikes
at the foundation of the cause of action for death, for it is based upon the same
facts.8 To circumvent this conclusion by asserting that the administrator acts
as a different person in each action is to pursue a legal fiction to an absurd
extreme. One court has asked, "Can the plaintiff commence an action wherein
she seeks to recover damages to herself based upon the acts of negligence of the
defendant which a competent court has already adjudicated not to exist? While
the right of recovery in the instant case is not the same right of recovery as in
the other case, each case is predicated upon and supported by the same facts." 9
"....judgment on a survival statute has no effect upon the damages under a death statute
since the damages in one case are based upon events preceding death, while the damages under
the other statute are based upon harm caused by death." In St. Louis, Iron Mtn. & Southern
R. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648 (z9r5), the Supreme Court stated that in a similar situation
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act there were two separate causes of action. See
note io, infra.
5 Mellon v. Goodyear, 277 U.S. 335 (i928); Lanning v. Erie R. Co., 265 App. Div. 576,
40 N.Y.S. 2d 404 (1943); cases collected in 39 A.L.R. 579. The instant problem is not affected
by the fact that recovery was had by the decedent in his lifetime, or by the administrator
under a survival statute. In either case the recovery is made upon the same theory, and is based
upon the same facts.
6McCarthy v. Wood Lumber Co., 219 Mass. 566, 107 N.E. 439 (1914).
7Secrest v. Pacific Electric R. Co., 6o Cal. App. 2d 746, 141 P. 2d 747 (1943); Little v.
Blue Goose Motor Coach Co., 244 Ill.
App. 427 (1927); Frescoln v. Puget Sound Traction,
Light &P. Co., 225 Fed. 441 (Wash., 1915); Schmelzer v. Central Furniture Co., 252 Mo. 12,
I58 S.W. 353 (i913); Brammer's Adm'r v. Norfolk & W.R. Co., 107 Va. 2o6, 57 S.E. 593
(i9o7); see Johnson v. Cleveland C.C. & St. Louis R. Co., 21 Ohio C.C.N.S. 268,43 Ohio C.C.
341 (izo5). Contra: May Coal Co. v. Robinette, 120 Ohio St. nio, i65 N.E. 576 (1929);
Peeples v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 115 S.C. 115, IO4 S.E. 541 (1920); Downs v. United R.
Co. of St. Louis, I84 S.W. 995 (Mo., i9r6); Spradlin v. Georgia R. &Electric Co., x39 Ga. 575,
77 S.E. 799 (i91,3). In Walton v. Southern Pacific Co., 8 Cal. App. 2d 290,48 P. 2d io8 (i935), a
nonsuit in an action for personal injuries was held not to bar an administrator from recovery
for wrongful death. But in Miller v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 96 F. 2d 69 (C.C.A. 2d, x938), it was
held that dismissal of an action for damages because of the statute of limitations was sufficient
to bar an action for wrongful death.
8Itis immaterial for the purpose of this discussion whether the suit be brought against
the administrator for damages, or brought by the administrator for personal injuries to the
decedent. The reason for invoking the doctrine of res judicata is that the same facts have already been litigated between the same parties.
9Frescoln v. Puget Sound Traction, Light & P. Co., 225 Fed. 441, 443 (Wash., 1915).
Here, a widow had lost an action to recovery damages for personal injuries to her deceased
husband. This adjudication was held to preclude further recovery under a wrongful death
statute.
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In an analogous situation the United States Supreme Court has held that
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act recovery might be had for both
pain and suffering and death, but that both grounds of recovery must be asserted in one action in order to avoid needless litigation."' Subsequently, the
Court recognized the desirability of this policy in the compulsory counterclaim
provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."x
The case raises an important question which the Massachusetts court avoided
by characterizing the administrator as two legal persons. Under Federal Rule
13 (a),' 2 failure to plead as a counterclaim a cause of action arising out of the
same transaction or occurrence bars a later action based upon those facts which
might have been pleaded as a counterclaim.13 In the instant case, the administrator did not plead his action for wrongful death in the federal court, but as10St. Louis, Iron Mtn. & Southern R. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648 (i915). The Court construed
broadly an amendment, § 9,36 Stat. 291 (i9io), 45 U.S.C.A. § 59 (I943), to the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51-58 (1943),which reads "....
but in such cases there shall be only one recovery for the same injury." The Court stated at
p. 659, ...... we think this clause .... is not intended to restrict the personal representative
to one right to the exclusion of the other, ....but to limit him to one recovery of damages for
both, and so to avoid the needless litigation in separate actions of what would better be settled
once for all in a single action." In Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Maerkl, i98 Fed. 1, 7 (C.C.A.
9 th, i912) the court said, "..... damages resulting from the personal suffering, and from such
death, not only may be recovered ....in one action but must be recovered in one action only
if at all .......
11Rule 13 "(a) COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim, not the subject of a pending action, which at the time of filing the pleader has
against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of
third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C.A. foil. § 723c. This
rule, adopted in 1938, is an outgrowth of Federal Equity Rule 30, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 723,
adopted in 1913, but broadened so as to include legal as well as equitable counterclaims. American Mills Co. v. American Surety Co., 26o U.S. 360 (1922); Advisory Committee Note i to
Federal Rules, 28 U.S.C.A. foil. § 723c, 'Rule i3; i Moore's Federal Practice 68 (1938).
"228 U.S.C.A. foll.

§ 723c.

'3 Audi Vision Corp. v. R.C.A. Mfg. Co., 136 F. 2d 621 (C.C.A. 2d, 1943); Home Ins. Co.
of N.Y. v. Trotter, 13o F. 2d 8oo (C.C.A. 8th ,i942); John R. Alley Co. v. Fed. Nat. Bank of
Shawnee, 124 F. 2d 995 (C.C.A. ioth, 1942); Hancock Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co.,
115 F. 2d 45 (C.C.A. 9th, i94o); Thierfield v. Postman's Fifth Ave. Corp., 37 F. Supp. 958
(N.Y., 1941); Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Burger, 27 F. Supp. 554 (N.Y., 1939); American
Mills Co. v. American Surety Co., 26o U.S. 36o (1922); Williams v. Bank of America Nat.
Ass'n, 55 F. 2d 884 (C.C.A. 2d, 1932); Howard v. Leete, 257 Fed. 918 (C.C.A. 6th, i919);
Cafiisch v. Humble, 251 Fed. i (C.C.A. 6th, 1918); Knupp v. Bell, 243 Fed. 157 (C.C.A. 4 th,
1917); Kreitmeyer v. Baldwin Drainage District, 2 F. Supp. 208 (Fla., 1932); Champion Spark
Plug Co. v. Champion Ignition Co., 247 Fed. 200 (Mich., 1917); Portland Wood Pipe Co. v.
Slick Bros. Construction Co., 222 Fed. 528 (Idaho, i915); Electric Boat Co. v. Lake Torpedo
Boat Co., 215 Fed. 377 (N.J., 1914); Salts Textile Mfg. Co. v. Tingue Mfg. Co., 208 Fed. 156
(Conn., 1913); Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. National Electric Sig. Co., 2o6 Fed. 295
(N.Y., 1913). The'cases before 1938 were decided under Federal Equity Rule 30, 28 U.S.C.A.
foll.
§ 723.
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serted it later in a state court. This raises the problem of whether a state court
will give full faith and credit to a federal rule of procedure.4
The fact that the federal courts have their own rules of procedure indicates
that they are not bound by the procedural rules of the state in which they sit,
even though they are bound by the substantive law of that state.' s By the same
reasoning, a state court is not bound to accept the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But a state court must give the same "full faith and credit" to a decree
of a federal court which it gives to a decree of a court of a sister state. 6 Rule.
13 (a) lays down a new rule of res judicata which in effect says, "It is not mandatory to plead as a counterclaim a claim arising from the same transaction or
occurrence, but failure to do so precludes its later assertion."' 7 Thus, the judgment of a federal court in which a counterclaim should have been pleaded, but
r4 This question has not been answered by judicial decision. But when the problem was
posed to Judge Clark in proceedings where the proposed Federal Rules were discussed, his
hopes were expressed:
"Mr. Drake: 'On this provision that the counterclaim should be set up in the action accompanied by your statement as to the penalty for failure, would that operate to bar the
presentation of the cause of action in the counterclaim in a state court later?'
"Mr. Clark: 'I don't suppose we could govern that finally. I think the answer would be
that it should. I don't know what the legal ruling is likely to be. I should think it very likely a
state court would so rule. But I am not at all sure how it would work out."' Proceedings of the
Cleveland Institution of the Federal Rules 248 (1938). In the Proceedings of the Washington
Institution of the Federal Rules 58 (1938) Judge Clark said, "We have followed the idea of the
equity rule that you must plead your counterclaims arising out of the transaction or situation
upon which the claim is based, when we say 'must' it means, of course, that if you don't do it no
penalty is going to apply to you in this case, but you will be barred from thereafter asserting it.
Of course it is true that we probably can't tell state courts what they should hold, but certainly
the significance of this rule, as of the equity rule upon which it is based, is that you must file
your counterclaim, or, if you don't, you can't sue on it separately."

ISCompare Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (I938).
6
z It has been said that Art. i, § 4 of the United States Constitution does not require a state
court to give "full faith and credit" to a decree of a federal court, since Art. i, § 4 merely says,
"Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the Public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State .... " (emphasis added). Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling
Mens Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (r93i). However, i Stat. 122 as amended in R.S. § 905, 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 687 states, "And the said records and judicial proceedings .... shall have such faith and
credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the
courts of the state from whence the records are taken." (emphasis added). This statute, along
with Art. 4, § i, requires a state court to give "full faith and credit" to a decree of a federal
court. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. i65 (z938); Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938); Hancock
Nat. Bank v. Farnum, 176 U.S. 64o (igoo); Metcalf v. Watertown, 153 U.S. 671 (1894);
Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3 (1882); Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cr. (U.S.) 481 (183); Botz v. Helvering, 134 F. 2d 538 (C.C.A. 8th, 1943); Mueller v. Mueller, 124 F. 2d 544 (C.C.A. 8th, 1942).
Some courts have reached this conclusion on the basis of the Constitution alone. "By the letter,
this section [Art. 4, § i] applies only to public acts, records and judicial proceedings of the
States, but construction has made it equally applicable to judgments in Federal courts." In
re Thompson's Estate, 339 Mo. 410, 424, 97 S.W. 2d 93 (1936); d. Hayes v. Payne Inv. Co.,
174 Neb. 24, 254 N.W. 684 (934); 34 C.J. 116o, n. 59.
17Although

the distinction between matters of procedure and matters of substance is often

a hazy one, it would seem a misnomer to call this rule a rule of procedure.
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was not, is res judicata and bars a subsequent attempt to plead the subject
matter of the omitted counterclaim. This result is accepted by the federal
courts 8 and should be so recognized by state courts.' 9 The Massachusetts
court, in allowing the administrator to plead a claim which should have been
pleaded as a counterclaim in the prior action,2° failed to give the judgment of
the federal district court the full faith and credit which that judgment merited.
The reason underlying the compulsory counferclaim rule is clearly to prevent
multiplicity of suits through settlement in one action of all controversies between the parties.21 But the rule also has its disadvantages. It requires a litigant
to present a claim at a time and place chosen by his adversary, which may well
result in inconvenience (and even impossibility) in producing witnesses, and
difficulty in effectively preparing a case. The very existence of a cause of action
may not be realized at the time, nor may the extent of damage be calculable.
Because of such considerations, courts have sometimes evaded the thrust of the
rule by holding that the claim did not arise out of the "same transaction or
occurrence''22or that it did not arise "at the time of filing."23 However, if it is
clearly inconvenient to bring the counterclaim in the action at hand, the Federal
Rules provide for separate trials "in furtherance of convenience and to avoid
prejudice."24 This provision allows wide latitude in the court's discretion and
would prevent use of the compulsory counterclaim rule to reach an inequitable
result.
,8Authorities cited note 13 supra.
19InRed Top Trucking Corp. v. Seaboard Freight Lines, 35 F. Supp. 740 (N.Y., 194o), it
was held that a federal court cannot enjoin a state court from hearing a later action because
application of the bar of the former judgment is for the court in which the later action is
brought.
20 There was no contention that the administrator's action for wrongful death did not come
under the provisions of Rule 13(a).
21Parmelee v. Chicago Eye Shield Co., 157 F. 2d 582 (C.C.A. 8th, 1946); John R. Alley
Co. v. Fed. Nat. Bank of Shawnee, 124 F. 2d 995 (C.C.A. ioth, 1942); Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v.
Maloney, 3 F.R.D. 341 (Pa., 1943); Penn. R. Co. v. Musante-Phillips Inc., 42 F. Supp. 340
(Cal., 1941); Schram v. Lucking, 3I F. Supp. 749 (Mich., i94o); Warren v. Indian Refining
Co., 3o F. Supp. 281 (Ind., 1939). "The compulsory counterclaim device is, of course, only a
means of bringing all logically related claims into a single litigation, through the penalty of precluding later assertion of omitted claims." Lesnick v. Public Industrials Corp., 144 F.2d 968,
975 (C.C.A. 2d, 1945).
- Clair v. Kastar, 138 F. 2d 828 (C.C.A. 2d, 1943) (patent action for the "use, manufacture or sale of defendant's .'stabilizers' by its customers" is not the same transaction or
occurrence as the "use, manufacture or sale by plaintiffs of their own 'stabilizers' "); Williams
v. Robinson, i F.R.D. 211 (D.C., I94O) (action for libel and slander growing out of defendant's accusation of adultery in a maintenance suit is not the same transaction or occurrence
as that which gave rise to the maintenance suit).
23Detroit, T. & I. R. Co. v. Pitzer, 6z N.E. 2d 93 (Ohio, 1943). Here a state court refused
to apply Rule 13 (a) to bar the second action because the claim could not have arisen before,
and was basedupon, the prior suit. While the court refused to apply the Rule, it indicated that
had the plaintiff's claim been mature, at the time of filing, it would not have entertained the
present action.
24Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 723c Rule 42 (b). See also Rule 13 (i).
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Under the ruling of the principal case, the administrator, almost certain to
fail in a federal court because of Rule 13 (a), averted defeat by bringing his
action for wrongful death in a state court. A state court should not be party to
the evasion of an unfavorable jurisdiction in order to secure a favorable judgment. 25 It was this very practice which caused so much criticism of the doctrine
27
of Swift v. Tyson 6 and finally resulted in the overruling of that case.

SERVICE ON FOREIGN EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS
UNDER NON-RESIDENT MOTORIST STATUTES
Service was made on the domiciliary administratrix of the estate of a South
Dakota decedent whose son had injured the plaintiff while driving decedent's
truck in Iowa. This service was in accordance with the-Iowa Non-Resident
Motorist Statute,' which provides for service upon the executor or administrator of the estate of a non-resident motorist who had been a party to an accident
in Iowa. Upon application of the defendants, the case was removed to a federal
court on the ground of diversity of citizenship. This court, on its own motion,
heard arguments as to its jurisdiction and held that despite the voluntary appearance of the defendant before the court, it lacked jurisdiction over her because of the doctrine that an executor or administrator has no legal standing as
such outside of the state in which he was appointed. The court went even further
and declared that portion of the Iowa statute allowing suit against foreign ex2
ecutors and administrators invalid. Knoop v. Anderson.
In reaching its decision, the court followed the general rule that an executor or
administrator cannot sue or be sued in his representative capacity outside the
state of his appointment.' While there has been some tendency to permit foreign
executors or administrators to sue, 4 the rule barring suits against them in courts
25Ikeler v. Detroit Trust Co., 30 F. Supp. 643 (Mich., i939). A party should not be permitted to bring in a federal court an action which should have been litigated in a state court, by
a strained construction of Federal Rules 23 and 14. Converse reasoning also applies. Prior to
the Federal Rules it had been held that a suit brought in a federal court under diversity of
citizenship would not permit a party to intervene as plaintiff when his residence was the same
as that of the defendant.,Such an attempt by the intervenor to circumvent state jurisdiction
was perceived and prevented. De Graffenreid v. Yount-Lee Oil Co., 30 Fed. 2d 574 (C.C.A.
5th, 1939); Clauss v. Palmer Union Oil Co., 222 Fed. 870 (C.C.A. 9th, x915); Forest Oil Co. v.
Crawford, ioi Fed. 849 (C.C.A. 3 d, igoo).

2116 Pet. (U.S.)

i (1842).

2 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The abuse caused by incorporation in
another jurisdiction consciously designed to enable the bringing of suits in federal courts under
diversity of citizenship, thus obtaining favorable "federal law" under the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson, i6 Pet. (U.S.) i (184 2),is illustrated in Black and White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v.
Brown and Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. S18 (i928). See Frankfurter, Judicial

Power of Federal and State Courts, 13 Corn. L.Q. 499, 525 (1928).
Iowa Code (1946) § 32X.498-321.5II.
2 7' F. Supp. 832 (Iowa, 1947).
3 Lawrence v. Nelson, 143 U.S. 215 (I891); Reynolds v. Stockton,

14o

U.S. 254 (89I);

Wyman v. Halstead, iog U.S. 654 (1883); Story, Conflict of Laws § 183 (1938).
4Helme v. Buckelew, 229 N.Y. 363, 128 N.E. 216 (r920).

